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A Public Use for the Dirty Side of
Economic Development: Finding
Common Ground Between Kelo and
Hathcock for Collateral Takings in
Brownfield Redevelopment
Consider a parcel of land, idle for some years because of
certain barriers to redevelopment created by real or perceived
environmental contamination, a "brownfield" site. 1 Surrounding
this site are several other parcels of land that are uncontaminated
and unhindered except for the effects of proximity to the
contaminated parcel. The private market has not addressed the
redevelopment of the contaminated parcel partially because any
use to which it might be put could not recover the costs of
remediating the site. However, by combining that parcel with the
adjacent parcels, the costs of remediation could be absorbed by a
larger project or mitigated by effective site planning.
For
instance, the additional land would allow the "dirtiest" part of the
site to be capped with something like a parking lot rather than
excavated for a building because the building, requiring a higher
2
remediation, could be placed elsewhere on the site.
Thus taking of otherwise sound property adjacent to the
contaminated parcel facilitates the return of that contaminated
property to active use. In addition, the redevelopment of the site
removes or mitigates the public health issues created by
contaminated land. The redevelopment of a site like this would be
a reasonable economic development initiative in many American
1. See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (2005).
2. See Deborah A. Lange & Sue McNeil, Brownfield Development: Tools
for Stewardship, 130 J. URB. PLAN. & DEV. 109, 110 (2004) (studies show one
of the characteristics of effective brownfield redevelopment is the presence of
landscaped/green areas).
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cities.
However, the reaction in many states to the Supreme Court's
decision in Kelo v. City of New London 3 may prohibit this strategy.
The Kelo decision raised popular concern that government could
now take one's property and give it to another private party so
long as that party's use generates more taxes or creates jobs in the
name of economic development. Justice O'Connor's dissent struck
a popular chord when she argued that "[n]othing is to prevent the
state from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory. '4 Fearing such
rampant abuse of eminent domain, many state legislatures
proposed various statutes to limit the exercise of eminent domain
and in some cases to outright exclude economic development as a
valid public purpose. 5 The states have the power to establish the
extent to which economic development may be a valid public
purpose for the exercise of eminent domain. 6 The concern is that
the state power to do away with this public purpose may hurt
rather than help eliminate brownfields.
Before barring economic development as a valid public
purpose, states should pause and consider what economic
development might encompass. Particular attention should be
paid to the many economic development initiatives predicated on
the redevelopment of environmentally contaminated lands.
Within the realm of economic development, the redevelopment of
contaminated lands constitutes a valid public purpose under more
traditional public use theories. For example, theories supporting
3. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
4. Id. at 2676.
5. See 2005 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv. 313 (LexisNexis); Assem. B. 590, 2005
Gen. Assem., 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.J. Res. 20, 2005 Leg., 2006
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); H.B. 4091, 94th Gen. Assem., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2005); S.B. 29, 2005 Gen. Assem., 2006 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005); H.B. 123, 84th
Leg., 2005 1st Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2005); H.B. 2029, 2005 Gen. Assem., 2005
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005); H.B. 2426, 104th Gen. Assem., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2005); Texas Government Code Ann. § 2206.001 (2005); S. Con. Res. 402,
77th Leg., 2005 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005). For a listing of State proposals to
prohibit Kelo type takings, banning economic development as a public
purpose, see CastleCoalition.org, Legislative Center, http://www.castle
coalition.org/legislation/index.html (last visited December 7, 2006); For
various poll results illustrating the Kelo backlash, see CastleCoalition.com,
The Polls are In, http://www.castlecoalition.org/resources/kelo-polls.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2006).
6. See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668.
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the use of eminent domain for the removal of blight can be applied
to the taking of private contaminated property.
But this
constitutes only a part of the economic development scenario.
Where blight or health risk is generally accepted as a basis for
taking the contaminated parcel itself,7 the redevelopment of
contaminated property may require broader takings to achieve
8
that end.
This Comment evaluates the extent to which existing legal
theories regarding public use support the exercise of eminent
domain to foster the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Kelo left
unanswered what exactly constitutes municipal economic
development. This Comment seeks to illustrate that brownfields
redevelopment is at least one part of that concept. Part I provides
a brief history and description of the eminent domain power, its
constitutional function, and how the doctrine of public use has
evolved from a narrow reading to a significantly broader modern
interpretation.
Part II is a brief primer in brownfield
redevelopment, summarizing the common challenges faced in
redeveloping these properties. This section will outline how
uncertain liability, high clean-up costs, and lender perception
create barriers to redevelopment. Part III applies the current
theories of public use to the taking of property to foster the
redevelopment of brownfield sites to return these contaminated
lands to active use and mitigate a public health threat. This
section compares the broad view of public use adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the narrower view exemplified by the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision in County of Wayne v.
Hathcock.9 Part IV concludes by proposing a path for state
legislation for the future use of eminent domain in this realm of
economic development. That path recognizes a significant need
for such development tools, particularly in aging urbanized areas
where re-development, as opposed to new development is the only
7. See Private Property Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005). A contaminated parcel of land is exempted from the definition of
economic development in the version passed by the House in response to the
Kelo decision.
8. The principles of urban planning and the basic responsibilities of
government that form the basis for the determination that additional land
may be required, are concepts also endorsed by the Supreme Court it the Kelo
decision. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
9. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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option.

I.

THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER

A. HistoricalRoots
The term "Eminent Domain" was first coined in the writings
of Hugo Grotius. 10 Grotius recognized a power of the state to take
property for the benefit of the community." l His basic rationale
was that the good of the many outweighed the good of the few.
However, that reasoning extended beyond mere necessity to the
fundamental character of government.12 The fundamental theory
on which the power of eminent domain is predicated has changed
since Grotius' writing, but the existence of the power has always
been recognized. 13 Although never explicitly mentioned in the
main body of the Constitution, the power is recognized by
implication in the Fifth Amendment's protections against its use,
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 14 The debate, however, is not over the implied
existence of the power, but the limits that may or may not be
imposed on the power. Although the limits imposed by the
various other elements of the Takings Clause have been the
subject of much debate, this Comment is concerned with the

public use component.
B. The Public Use Journey
the

There is some debate over whether the words "public use" in
Fifth Amendment are simply descriptive rather than

10. PHILIP NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1-15 (Julius L.
Sackman ed., 2005) ("[T]he property of subjects is under the eminent domain
of the state, so that the state or he who acts for it may use and even alienate
and destroy such property ... for ends of public utility, to which ends those
who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended that private
ends should give way.").

11.

Id.

12. Id.
13. See id. at 117-22 (originally considered a reserved property right, the
power is now accepted as an inherent trait of sovereignty). See also BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004) (defining eminent domain as "the
inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,
esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for
the taking.").
14.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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limiting. 15
On one hand, those subscribing to a descriptive
interpretation believe the phrase merely outlines which takings
require compensation. 16 On the other hand, those accepting the
limiting view believe property may only be taken when the
property is literally used by the public. 17 Years of judicial
interpretation of public use have imposed limits on the exercise of
eminent domain and in fact no court has adopted the descriptive
interpretation. 18 Thus, assuming that the phrase imposes some
limitation, we turn to what that limitation might be and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of what constitutes "public use." 19
From its very beginnings the Supreme Court has held that
the taking of property from A to give to B is an abuse of eminent
domain. 20 Still today, the taking of private property from one
private party and directly transferring it to another private party
seems to fail the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. 2 1 "A purely private taking could not withstand the
scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no
'2 2
legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.
However, what, if anything, is purely private?
Certainly a purely public use poses no problem. At the center
of its vision of public use, the Supreme Court has recognized that
23
land taken for use by the public satisfies the Fifth Amendment.

15. See Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original
Understandingof the So-Called "Takings Clause", 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245,
1246-48 (2002).
16. Id. at 1249.
17. See Thomas W. Merril, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 71 (1986).

18. See Harrington, supranote 15, at 1254-56.
19. See id.
20. Eight years after it first assembled, the Supreme Court said in
Calder v. Bull: "a law that takes property from A, and gives it to B: It is
against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with
SUCH powers." 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798). Over the past 200 years the Court has
reiterated this point many times, most recently in the Kelo decision.
21. Although hedging its statement, the Court referred to such transfers
as "aberrations" and that "such an unusual exercise of government power
would certainly raise a suspicion that private purpose was afoot." Kelo v. City
of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2667 (2005).
22. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
23. See Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 706 (1923)
(stating "[t]hat a taking of property for a highway is a taking for public use
has been universally recognized from time immemorial").
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In Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, the local government
sought to take private ranch lands to construct a road. 24 The
Court held that building a road to connect to a highway for use by
the traveling public was a valid public use. 25 The construction or
expansion of a roadway is a common and valid public purpose
where it is used by the general public.
As the nation continued to develop, new circumstances
required expansion of the concept beyond pure public use. Public
use was found in the taking of land for transfer to private railroad
companies, common carriers, and utilities. 26 The basic rationale
for these transfers was that the public would use the products or
services of common carriers or utilities and that it was more
27
efficient that the land be held in private hands.
The scope of "public use" broadened again from the direct
public use of services to a direct public benefit. In Berman v.
Parker, the Supreme Court upheld the taking by eminent domain
28
of private commercial land for transfer to another private party.
The local government intended to redevelop the property pursuant
to a comprehensive plan prepared by the local redevelopment
agency. 2 9 Although the overall plan was intended to remedy the
substandard housing, lack of infrastructure, and deteriorating
conditions in the area, the plaintiffs particular property was not
"blighted. '30 Surveys conducted as part of the planning process
24. Id.
25. Id. at 708. This case also introduces the Court's emerging view of a
broader "public use" doctrine. Citing the example of public parks, the Court
noted that the road would provide a scenic route along the shore. Thus, in
addition to a route through the County, the condemnation was a matter of
public health, recreation and enjoyment. Id. at 707-08.
26. See Secombe v. R.R. Co., 90 U.S. 108, 118 (1874) ("[T]he taking of
private property in order that a railroad may be constructed, is a public
necessity.").
27. Id. at 111.

28. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 33. Blight is:
a condition of property or the uses of property in parts of a city,
town, or neighborhood that are detrimental to the physical, social,
and/or economic well-being of a community. It can include
abandoned buildings or those severely neglected by their owners,
vacant lots full of rubble and garbage, or dangerous and/or illegal
uses such as crack houses.
http://www.urbanplan.org/UPGlossary/UPGlossary.html#b.
(last visited
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showed that "64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair,... 29.3%
'3 1
lacked electricity, . . . 83.8% lacked central heating."
The Court approved the taking of the plaintiffs non-blighted
property even though it did not contribute to the deteriorated
conditions. 32 It further held that the broad police powers of the
state make the general welfare of its citizens a proper objective of
the legislature. 33 Thus, the power of eminent domain was merely
a means to achieving that objective of protecting the health and
general welfare of the community. 34 This means-end rationale
justified implementing the comprehensive redevelopment plan by
which non-blighted property is taken along with blighted. 3 5 In
Berman, "the experts concluded that if the community were to be
healthy, if it were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as
though possessed of a congenital disease, the area must be
' 36
planned as a whole.
Thirty years after Berman v. Parker, the Court reaffirmed its
broad interpretation of public use in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff.37 The Court upheld a Hawaiian Act designed to remedy a
feudalistic system of land ownership by redistributing the land
held by a few private parties to the private tenants that had been
leasing. 38 The legislature had found the state's antiquated system
of land ownership was disturbing the general peace and welfare of
its citizens, raising the price of land and interfering with the
residential fee simple market. 39 The Court held that the goals of
the Act were "within the bounds of the State's police powers and
that the means the legislature had chosen to serve those goals
40
were not arbitrary, capricious, or selected in bad faith."
The fact that the property was to be taken from one group of
private owners and transferred to another was not fatal to the act.

Sept. 15, 2006).
31.

Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-30.

32.
33.
34.

See id. at 34.
See id. at 32-33.
See id.

35.

See id. at 34-35.

36.

Id. at 34.

37.
38.

467 U.S. 229 (1984).
See id. at 232-33.

39.
40.

Id. at 232.
Id. at 235.
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A legitimate public purpose for the action existed.4 1 The Court
held that "the 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous with
the scope of a sovereign's police powers. ''42 The Court focused on
the purpose of the action itself and not the details of the
transaction. 4 3 If the legislature's purpose for the action fell within
the scope of its police power then the Court would defer to that
determination as serving a public use.4
C. Economic Development as a PublicPurpose
1. A Broad View of Public Use
In Kelo v. New London, a divided U.S. Supreme Court upheld
an eminent domain taking for economic development purposes.
The taking was part of a comprehensive plan to revitalize a
particular area of the city designed to bring increased tax revenue
and new jobs. 4 5 In 1990 the state of Connecticut had designated
New London a "distressed municipality. '46 In the decade that
followed, the City experienced its lowest population since the
1920's, an unemployment rate that was double that of the State,
and the closing of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center that had
employed 1,500 people. 47 To address the city's general decline, a
partnership between the state and local officials targeted the Fort
48
Trumbull area of the city for economic revitalization.
The City reactivated the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC) to prepare and implement a revitalization
plan for the area. 4 9 Following a two-year planning process the
state and local governments approved a plan to redevelop ninety
acres of the Fort Trumbull area. 50 The area consisted of 115
privately owned properties of land that would be reassembled into

41. See id. at 243-44.
42. Id. at 240; see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992).
43. Id. at 244. ("It is only the taking's purpose and not its mechanics,
that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.").
44. Id.
45. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 2659.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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seven development parcels for redevelopment into various uses
such as a conference hotel at the center of a "small urban village,"
an urban neighborhood, research and development office space,
51
and supporting uses such as parking.
The plan was intended to create jobs, increase tax revenue,
make the city more attractive, create recreational opportunities on
the waterfront, and build momentum for other revitalization
efforts. 52 In particular, the plan sought to capitalize on Pfizer
Inc.'s commitment to build a new research facility on a site
adjacent to the plan area. 53 Several residents in the plan area
challenged the taking of their individual properties for the
purpose of economic development as an invalid public use. They
argued that their properties were not blighted and were only
targeted for acquisition because they were located within the
54
planning area.
In a 5-4 majority, the Court reiterated its broad interpretation
of public use and its policy of deference to the determinations of
the state legislatures articulated in Berman and Midkiff. The
Court held that the local government's determination that the
area was so distressed as to justify public action for economic
rejuvenation was entitled to deference as a valid public use. 55 The
Court highlighted the City's efforts in urban planning to
coordinate various land uses to "form a whole greater than the
sum of the parts. '56 Based on the plan's comprehensive nature
and the thorough process involved in its creation, the Court
reasoned that the takings must be resolved as a whole rather than
piecemeal. 57 The Court held that "economic development is a
traditional and long accepted function of government." 58

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Note also that "the trial judge and all members of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut agreed that there was no evidence of an illegitimate
purpose in this case." Id. at 2661. Leveraging the Pfizer site is a strategic
planning decision consistent with modern sustainable planning theories for
capturing efficiencies through collocation of similar or complementary uses.
54. See id. at 2660.
55. See id. at 2665.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id.
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2. A Narrow View of Public Use
Although Kelo has determined that economic development
may constitute a public use for the exercise of eminent domain, it
also held that the states have the authority to craft their own
definitions of public use. 59 Today, many states are running with
that option. Alabama was the first state to pass legislation after
Kelo. 60 Just a little more than one month after the Court issued
its opinion, Alabama barred the use of eminent domain for private
economic development or to enhance the tax base. 6 1 Texas has
also enacted legislation prohibiting the use of eminent domain for
62
general economic development purposes.
In addition to state legislatures defining public use through
statutes, state courts are also playing a role. Interestingly, one
year before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Kelo, the court that is often attributed with opening the door for
economic development as a valid public use set new limits on
eminent domain for that purpose. 6 3 In 1981, the Michigan
Supreme Court, had issued the landmark decision in Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit.64 In allowing the city of Detroit
to take land for a new General Motors facility the state supreme
court established economic development as a valid public use for
65
the exercise of eminent domain.
The taking in Poletown involved the acquisition of land by the
City of Detroit for transfer to General Motors so that it could
construct a new assembly plant. 66 The Michigan Supreme Court
held that the taking of private property by eminent domain for
transfer to another private party for purposes of development

59. Id. at 2668 ("We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any
State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.").
60. See 2005 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv. 313 (LexisNexis); see also Institute for
Justice, With Governor's Signature Today, Alabama Will Become First State
To Curb Eminent Domain Abuse After Kelo, Aug. 3, 2005, http://www.ij.org/
private-property/castle/8&3-05pr.html.

61. Id.
62.

See TEXAS GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005).

63. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(Mich. 2004).
64. 304 N.W.2d 455.
65. Id. at 459-60.
66. Id. at 457.
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satisfied the public use requirement of the Michigan Constitution
where the significance to the public was demonstrated and "the
benefit to a private interest [was] merely incidental." 6 7 In its
reasoning, the court equated the power of eminent domain with
the power to regulate land uses through zoning and with nuisance
prevention, concepts falling within the police power of the state. 68
Thus the Poletown court had adopted the broader interpretation of
public use later endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo.
Nearly twenty-five years later, the Michigan Supreme Court
reversed the decision of Poletown when it decided Hathcock. In
accordance with the dissenting opinion in Poletown, Hathcock held
that taking private property by eminent domain and transferring
to another private party is only appropriate where (1) public
necessity of the extreme sort requires collective action; or (2) the
property remains subject to public oversight after being
transferred to a private party; or (3) the property is selected
because of 'facts of independent public significance,' as opposed to
the interests of the private party to which the property is
69
transferred.
In Hathcock, Wayne County had proposed to use its power of
eminent domain to condemn property for the construction of a
business and technology park "to reinvigorate the struggling
economy." 70 There was no argument that the project would in fact
benefit the public by bringing new jobs, increasing tax revenue,
and attracting investment to the area. 7 1 However, public benefit
is only one necessary condition; if public benefit alone was the sole
basis for taking private property there would be little, if any, limit
to the eminent domain power. 72 The court held that to justify the
67. Id. at 459.
68. Id. ("Eminent domain is an inherent power of the sovereign of the
same nature as, albeit more severe than, the power to regulate the use of
land through zoning or the prohibition of public nuisances.").
69. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781.
70. Id. at 769-70.
71. Id. at 778.
72. Id. at 786. The court reasoned:
To justify the exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis of the fact
that the use of that property by a private entity seeking its own profit
might contribute to the economy's health is to render impotent our
constitutional limitations on the government's power of eminent
domain. Poletown's "economic benefit" rationale would validate
practically any exercise of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity.
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taking of private property by eminent domain to be transferred to
another private party, the taking would also have to entail one of
the following elements:
Public Necessity:
The public necessity required to justify condemnation of
private land for transfer to a private party envisions a scenario
where the existence of the transferee's enterprise depends on using
land that can only be assembled by the government. 73 Referring
to such parties as "instrumentalities of commerce," the frequent
example is the railroad, where only the government's use of
eminent domain can avoid the pitfalls of the holdout that could
74
derail the construction of the line entirely.

Post-Transfer Accountability to the Public:
Where the private transferee remains accountable to the
public for its use of the property, the public use requirement may
be satisfied. 75 The key test according to the Michigan Court is
whether the use of the land by the private transferee is subject to
"some" enforceable measure of control by the public.

76

The basic

After all, if one's ownership of private property is forever subject to the
government's determination that another private party would put one's
land to better use, then the ownership of real property is perpetually
threatened by the expansion plans of any large discount retailer,
"megastore," or the like.
Id. (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 781 ("The existence of eminent domain for private corporations
has been limited to those enterprises generating public benefits whose very
existence depends on the use of land that can be assembled only by the
coordination central government alone is capable of achieving.") (citing
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 304, 477-81
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in original).
74.

Id.

75. See id. at 782. Note also that in Kelo the proposed sales to private
parties included lease and sale guarantees for development consistent with
the plan. See 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n.15.
76. See id. The court cited its previous opinion in Lakehead Pipeline Co.
v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. 1954), as an example of sufficient control
where the plaintiff has "pledged itself to transport in intrastate commerce,"
that plaintiffs pipeline was used pursuant to directions from the Michigan
Public Service Commission, and that the state would be able to enforce those
obligations, should the need arise. Id.

FINDING COMMON GROUND

2006]

rationale is to preserve the public use that justifies the taking. 77
This element also seems to seek a device to create a stronger
public element than would otherwise exist, i.e., a railroad's title to
the land contingent on the land's continuing use for a railroad. 78
Independent Public Significance:
The court also discussed the alternative requirement that the
condemned land have been selected for reasons independent of the
private transferee's interests. 79 The clearest example is slum
clearance where the land to be condemned is selected because of
the location of blight.8 0 Likewise, public utilities and railroads
which require land based on the location of their respective service
areas satisfy this criterion.8 1 The land in those cases is identified
by the public's interest in transportation or utility services across
the land rather than the private interests of the company.8 2 Other
criteria such as the location of population centers and geographic
barriers like rivers that determine what land must be taken would
83
constitute independent factors.
The court in Hathcock held the county's development project
contained none of the validating elements of public use for such a
transfer to private parties.8 4 The prolific "existence" of similar
uses that had formed without collective public action was ample
85
evidence that the exercise of eminent domain was not necessary.
Furthermore, without any enforceable instrument to guarantee
that the businesses that would occupy the condemned properties
would remain there as a continuing benefit to the local economy,
86
the County could not establish sufficient public accountability.
Finally, the only public benefits the County could demonstrate
resulted from the private redevelopment rather than the act of

77.

See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 479-80.

78. Id.
79. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004);
see also Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
80. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 684 N.W.2d at 783.
85. Id.
86.

Id. at 784.
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condemnation.8 7 Thus no facts of independent public significance
were presented.BR
Because of this narrow interpretation of public use and its
overruling of Poletown, the decision in Hathcock may be
considered the antithesis to the Kelo opinion. However, the
Hathcock elements may be present in the particular realm of
economic development involving brownfields.8 9 Thus both Kelo
and Hathcock could provide a basis for the application of the
eminent domain power in brownfields redevelopment.
II. BROWNFIELD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Brownfields are "real property, the expansion, redevelopment,
or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant." 90
This broad definition offers only slightly more guidance than the
public use clause of the Constitution. There are, however, a few
broad parameters; one parameter is the degree of contamination.
If the land is so contaminated as to justify its listing on the
National Priorities List (Superfund) or a State Priorities List it is
not a brownfield site under the definition of the Brownfields
Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act (BRERA). 9 1
Another parameter is the land use; the site must be a commercial
or industrial property. 92 The General Accounting Office (GAO)
estimates that there are over 400,000 brownfield sites
nationwide. 93 One Boston neighborhood, located around Dudley
Street, covers just one and a half square miles but has within its
94
boundaries 54 state-identified hazardous waste sites.

This Comment evaluates the utility of eminent domain to
acquire the land surrounding brownfield sites. 95 The definition
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.

90.

See Brownfield Revitalization Act, supra note 1.

91.

Id.

92.

For example significant lead paint as might be found at a residential

home may fall within the type of health risk posed by brownfield sites but is
technically not eligible for such classification.
93. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: REUSE OF
URBAN INDUSTRIAL SITES, GAO/RCED-95-172 (1995).

94. Id.
95. This Comment is addressed to brownfield sites as opposed to
Superfund sites. Superfund sites, regulated by the Comprehensive
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leaves room for a large variety of potential sites ranging in
possibilities between a Superfund site 96 at one end and at the
other end a clean site burdened only with the stigma of
contamination because of prior industrial uses. As a frame of
reference, consider a real site in the downtown area of a mid-sized
New England town, approximately half an acre in size,
surrounded by a hodge-podge of small office buildings and retail
shops, single and multi-family homes, and auto services. A Phase
II Site Assessment 97 reports a number of various contaminants
including an unidentified "purple ooze."
The particular
characteristics that might constitute a brownfield vary greatly,
but for the purposes of this Comment those variable
characteristics are less important than the nature of the
challenges involved in redeveloping such sites.
The challenges to redeveloping a brownfield site come in
several forms. For example, because current property owners
cannot completely absolve themselves of responsibility for cleanup
by selling to a developer, many contaminated sites remain

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), are a
higher order of magnitude than brownfield sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000).
They pose a greater and more immediate health and safety risk. The severe
degree of contamination of Superfund sites greatly restricts either the
allowable redevelopment uses or the time period in which any redevelopment
might be achievable (i.e., decades) or both. Thus the practical application of
eminent domain in that context is tenuous. The lower level of contamination
at brownfield sites offers a greater potential of redevelopment making the
necessity of public intervention a closer question. That reality, coupled with
the abundant existence of such sites, makes them a more practical focus of
this discussion.
96. See id.
97. A Phase II Assessment is generally the second stage of site
evaluation requiring site access, soil boring and chemical analysis, it does not
involve the detailed remediation plans and cost analysis of Phase III but is
considerably more detailed than a Phase I Assessment. A Phase I
Assessment is primarily a records search and analysis of prior uses. See
Public Building Services, U.S. General Services Administration, The Site
Selection Guide, 102-05 (2005), available at http://www.gsa.gov/siteselection;
see also, ASTM E1527-05, Standard Practice for Environmental Site
Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Process, ASTM
international, document summary available at http://www.astm.org; ASTM
E1903-97, Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessments: Phase H
Environmental Site Assessment Process, ASTM international, document
summary available at http://www.astm.org.
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stagnant.9 8 Also, the threat of becoming entangled in legal battles

with prior owners and uncertain future liability deters developers
from these sites. 99
Many developers know there is often a high price for
executing a cleanup, but it is more difficult to determine the
precise cost of redevelopment due to uncertain future liabilities.
For example, it is difficult to say how much it might cost to
remove the "purple ooze" if it cannot be identified, let alone
accurately quantified prior to acquisition or development. 10 0
Although interpretations to the All Appropriate Inquiry (AAI)
standard 10 1 may relieve some of that concern, the high price of
investigating brownfield sites remains a significant barrier to a

private market that often has multiple "greenfield" alternatives
available. Additionally, the barriers to redeveloping contaminated
land, often in urban centers, have had the negative consequence of
102
overdevelopment in suburban and rural areas.
Furthermore, as much as the public would generally support
of contaminated land, there is usually significant
remediation
the
98.

Todd S. Davis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A

COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 9 (Todd

S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS].
99. Id.
100. Id. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
REDEVELOPING BROWNFIELDS: How STATES AND LOCALITIES USE CDGB FUNDS

6 (Oct. 1998) ("[T]he typical cost of cleaning up a brownfield, based on a study
of State cleanup programs in the early 1990s, is thought to be $400,000."),
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/econdev/ redevelo.html.
101. The All Appropriate Inquiry (AAI) standard is a provision in the
Small Business Liability Relief and Revitalization Act providing liability
relief to certain prospective land buyers who conduct adequate and
appropriate due diligence. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (2005). The lack of clarity
regarding what satisfied the AAI standard created significant risk of future
liability for prospective brownfield developers. In lieu of congressional
assistance clarifying the definition, EPA has attempted to provide guidance
through interim standards. See ASTM E1527-00, Standard Practice for
Environmental Site Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assessment
available at
summary
International,
document
Process, ASTM
http://www.astm.org. The All Appropriate Inquiry Standard was finalized
and the final rule was published in a NOFA on Nov. 1, 2005. See 40 C.F.R. §
312 (2005).
102. See Davis, supra note 98, at 12-13; see also EPA, Smart Growth in
Brownfield Communities, http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/brownfields.htm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2006) [hereinafter EPA] (quoting President George W.
Bush, "one of the best ways to arrest urban sprawl is to develop
brownfields").
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conflict on how the land should be redeveloped. The community
might be seeking a passive or traditionally cleaner use that
requires a higher level of remediation and offers a lower return
than what a developer might require. Even if the developer might
be satisfied with a prospective return, access to capital for
redevelopment is also hindered by the presence or potential
presence of contamination. Commercial lenders are significantly
less likely to participate in a transaction involving contaminated
land for fear of potential liability for remediation costs and the
103
lower value of contaminated land as collateral upon default.
With the passage of BRERA in 2002, Congress took a
significant step toward tackling the challenges of brownfields
redevelopment. 104 However, the funding incentives and liability
reforms are limited. Brownfield redevelopment remains one of the
most challenging municipal development issues. 105 The various
federal and state financing programs made available to assist
brownfield redevelopment are evidence that the private market is
not addressing the redevelopment of these sites and that public
06
intervention is necessary.
Furthermore,
when considering the
disproportionate
distribution of contaminated lands in minority and poor
communities, the need for public intervention becomes more
apparent. 107 This is where eminent domain may play a role in
103.

Davis, supra note 100, at 11; see also Charles Bartsch & Barbara

Wells, Financing Strategies for Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment 7
(Northeast-Midwest Inst. 2003), available at http://www.nemw.org/BF
financingredev.pdf.
104. David B. Hird, The Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental
RestorationAct, in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 98, at xxv.
105. See generally 4 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, RECYCLING AMERICA'S
LAND: A NATIONAL REPORT ON BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT (2003), available

at
http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/brownfields/RecycleAmerica2003.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS].
106. Various federal agencies have developed programs to identify
Brownfield redevelopment. For example, HUD has established the
Brownfields Economic Development Initiative (BEDI) to complement its
Section 108 Loan program; EPA helps capitalize Brownfields Revolving Loan
Funds, and various tax credits are available. See Charles Bartsch, Federal
Family of Funds: What Can Be Tapped for Brownfield Needs? (NortheastMidwest
Inst.
2005),
http://www.nemw.org/fed%20family%20of%20
brownfield%20funds.ppt.
107. See D. Farber & E. Krieg, Unequal Exposure to Ecological Hazards:
Environmental Injustices in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
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mitigating the detrimental effects of brownfield sites in poor and
minority communities.

As Justice Thomas pointed out in his

dissent in Kelo, historically the exercise of eminent domain for
economic development purposes has had a disproportionate effect
on minority communities. 108 The majority of families displaced by
urban renewal initiatives have been non-white with low
incomes.109

In

fact,

the

Poletown

neighborhood

was

predominantly "lower-income and elderly.""I 0
The other side to a brownfield site is the effect of
contaminated land on the health, safety, and general welfare of
the community. Many communities consider brownfield sites
largely from a development perspective focusing on the effects of

contaminated land on private market interest and the land as a
commodity in the community that should be utilized, preferably to
its highest and best use.

However, the mere presence of

contaminants poses a basic risk of exposure to potentially harmful
substances. In addition the potential of pollutant migration may
threaten adjacent properties and groundwater
supplies.
Furthermore, as underutilized and abandoned land, many sites
are used as dumping grounds raising additional concerns for
public health. "'
Although collateral takings will not relieve a redeveloper of
liability, the risks when measured against a larger project may be
more acceptable.
Like any real estate development, when
deciding to undertake a brownfield project a developer will
determine the probable rate of return. However, the inherent
uncertainties in a brownfield site make this determination more
complicated. Thus any factors that might reduce the uncertainty
would reduce one of the typical barriers to such a redevelopment.
(Northeastern Univ. Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.socant.neu.edu
/download/final unequal-exposurejreport_2005.pdf.
108. See 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2687 (2005).
109. Id.
110.

Id. (citing J. WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 58 (1989)).

111. See Davis, supra note 98, at 7. For examples of exposure pathways
and the health risks from contaminated sites visit the ASTDR website.
ASTDR, http://www.astdr.gov (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). "People who live
near hazardous waste sites may be exposed to PCBs by consuming PCBcontaminated sportfish and game animals, by breathing PCBs in air, or by
drinking PCB-contaminated well water." ASTDR.com, Public Health
Statement, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/phs17.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2006).
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The collateral takings considered here can reduce the uncertainty
by providing the opportunity for remediation alternatives through
site planning. Should unexpected contamination be found after
acquisition the problem could potentially be addressed through
less expensive design changes rather then exorbitant removal or
clean up costs.
Likewise, the efficiencies that may be captured in such a
development may mitigate the high costs of cleanup and
investigation of potentially contaminated sites.
The greater
revenue generating square footage of the larger project obtained
with only marginal increases in production costs can mitigate the
risks. As the potential return increases the amount of risk a
prospective developer is likely to find acceptable increases. Along
with the flexibility to accommodate some of the uncertainty as
noted above, the collateral takings may have a significant effect on
the risk-return calculation.
For the same reasons a developer may be more interested in
such a redevelopment, a lender may also be more willing to
participate in the venture. This would seem particularly true
112
when not all the land securing the financing is contaminated.
The lender's fear of being saddled with contaminated land upon a
default could be reduced. Obviously the risk could not be
eliminated entirely and if a default occurred prior to any
remediation the value of the uncontaminated land might still be
diminished.
However, where the public action can aid in
addressing the barriers to redevelopment that the private market
cannot, that risk need not be reduced to zero. In addition, the
assembly of land, particularly in accordance with a rational
development plan, that can leverage existing infrastructure will
also create a site more competitive with available greenfield
alternatives. 113

112. See generally Davis, supra note 98, at 11 ("[T]he prospect of
foreclosing on contaminated collateral in the event of default dampens lender
interest in brownfield loans.").

113.

See B. Robert Amjad & Adam Fishman, Acquisition Considerations

for Brownfields Properties,in BROWNFIELDS, supra note 98, at 69-72.
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III. BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT - A PUBLIC USE
A. Simple Blight
For the last half-century, the acquisition of private property
by eminent domain to remove blight has been an accepted public
use.114 Blight is a somewhat ambiguous term, most easily defined
by "you will know it when you see it."115 However, blight is more
than just a dilapidated property; the concept extends beyond the
condition of a property itself and considers the effects a property
has on its surroundings. 1 16 These effects may come in many forms
such as depressed property values or deteriorating structural

conditions the underlying characteristic of which is a general
7
resistance to remedy by traditional market forces."1
As inherently abandoned and underutilized sites burdened by
the presence or perception of environmental contamination,

8
brownfield sites would generally fit a simple blight definition."1
The nature of a brownfield site deters private market forces from
attempting to redevelop the land. The barriers created by the
environmental condition thus have the same effect as small
parcelization and scattered ownership that often characterize

blight and justify its remediation on the basis of the impracticality
of private market redevelopment. 119 In addition to their unique
environmental issues, brownfield sites often share the physical

114. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954).
115. See id. at 33.
116. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (Deering 2005)
Defining a blighted area as:
[T]he combination of conditions ...is so prevalent and so substantial
that it causes a reduction of, or lack of, proper utilization of the area to
such an extent that it constitutes a serious physical and economic
burden on the community which cannot reasonably be expected to be
reversed or alleviated by private enterprise or governmental action, or
both, without redevelopment.

Id.
117. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121B, § 1 (2006) (describing the various
conditions that constitute a blighted area).
118. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT, STATE OF THE STATES ON
BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES, at

4-5 (1995) available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Otal/DATA/1995/95
40.PDF (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).

119. Id.
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characteristics of blighted property. 120
Moreover, the real
potential of pollutant migration to contiguous parcels, the
subsequent liabilities, along with the stigma that attaches to
contaminated land also have tangible negative impacts on
surrounding land. 12'
Eminent domain often functions as a blight removal tool by
assembling land to create developable parcels and capture
efficiencies. In the same way, eminent domain may foster the
redevelopment of a contaminated parcel through collateral takings
of contiguous land. This raises a question however about whether
a contaminated property always rises to the level of blight. A
122
building that is in disrepair does not always rise to this level.
However, there is a significant distinction; a brownfield is defined
by an impairment to the land itself. Thus a brownfield will
always share the justifications for blight removal that are based
on inherent characteristics of the land such as obsolete
parcelization and location factors.
In addition, eminent domain may aid in maximizing the
health and safety benefits of brownfield remediation. Even when
the private sector participates in a brownfield redevelopment it
will naturally seek the lowest (cheapest) level of remediation in
order to maximize profits.123 Thus, not surprisingly, the market's
interest in brownfield remediation is not synonymous with the
public's interest in health and safety. Health and safety is a
public purpose falling under the general purview of the police
power. 124 The Court has held that the public purpose under the
police power is synonymous with public use. 125 Thus where the
taking of collateral properties would raise the level of remediation
in a site, the marginal increase in health and safety benefits
should satisfy the public use requirement of eminent domain. The

120. See CHARLES BARTSCH ET AL., COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A RESOURCE BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES 8 (Northeast-Midwest Inst. 1996),

available at http://www.nemw.orgbrownfields.
121. Id.
122. In Kelo, the State had designated the City of New London as a whole
as a "distressed municipality," yet there was no argument that the plaintiffs'
properties were blighted. See 125 S. Ct. at 2658, 2660.
123. See generally Charles Bartsch et. al., supra note 122, at 7-12.
124. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954).
125. See Midkiff v. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).

250 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:229
removal of the health and environmental threat by taking the
adjacent good land to create value in the larger site significant
enough to make the remediation financially feasible is itself a
126
public use.
The alternative to these larger takings would argue for taking
the contaminated parcel alone. The uncontaminated land would
be acquired by the private market. The whole site would then be
However,
redeveloped through public-private partnerships.
without a guarantee that other parcels could be assembled, willful
acquisition of a contaminated parcel places the acquiring party in
the chain of responsibility for clean-up without a reasonable
means of recovering the cost that must be incurred to put the land
127
to productive use.

B. Applying the Hathcock Elements in Brownfield Redevelopment
In addition to the blight analogy, Michigan's interpretation of
public use may support collateral takings to aid a brownfield
redevelopment. The three elements put forth in Hathcock were
distilled from Michigan's case law permitting the long accepted
transfer of condemned lands to private parties where
Hathcock
'instrumentalities of commerce were involved."' 28
illustrated that not all economic development initiatives would
necessarily include any one of those elements. 129 However, even
under the Hathcock court's narrower interpretation of public use,
collateral takings to foster the redevelopment of a contaminated
site would include at least one, if not all, of the three required
elements.

126. Whether the city undertakes the remediation itself or transfers the
property to a private party to accomplish the same remediation is merely a
choice of means to the same end rather than the purpose of the eminent
domain action. In fact transfer to a private party may capture additional
efficiencies that would benefit the community. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666.
127. See generally Hird, supra note 106 (BRERA provides liability to
purchasers that satisfy specific conditions. However, the relief is not absolute.
Furthermore that relief does not extend to the liability that may be imposed
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
128. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455, 477-78 (Mich. 1981).

129.

See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004).
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1. Public Necessity
Only where the action of the condemning authority is
necessary to achieve the very existence of the enterprise can
private property be taken and transferred to another private
party. 130 A rail-line cannot exist between two cities unless all the
properties along its path can be assembled. Thus the role of
government land assembly to negate the likelihood of a holdout
problem rises to a sufficient level of necessity.' 3 1 Brownfield
redevelopment is often a function of local necessity where the only
132
land remaining for growth and redevelopment is contaminated.
It is not logical to expect the private market to acquire the
contaminated parcel without certainty that it can recover its costs.
Where cost recovery can only be achieved through assembly of
collateral lands the necessity of public intervention rises to the
level established by Hathcock.
The Hathcock court held the existence of similar uses that
were able to develop without the assistance of eminent domain as
evidence of the lack of necessity. 3 3 Accordingly, successful
brownfield redevelopments accomplished by tax incentives,
creative financing, or any means other than those proposed here,
would seem to negate the need for eminent domain. However,
unlike the shopping centers and office parks the Hathcock court
referenced, the object here is relative to the land itself and not the
improvements upon it. Although what the land use might yield in
regard to jobs and taxes is also relevant here, it is not the sole
justification for the condemnation.
2. Accountability
A condemned property may be transferred to another private
party for redevelopment if that party remains accountable to the
public. 134 Zoning and municipal regulation should not be enough
to constitute sufficient accountability. Otherwise, there would be
few if any properties that would fail to satisfy this element. 135 A
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 781.
See id. at 781-82.
See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 105, at 5-8.
See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
See id. at 782.
See id. at 786.
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formal device is required assuring an enforceable right to compel
use of the property consistent with the purpose for which it was
taken. 136
Thus although the railroads were subject to
considerable regulation, many of the transfers were also made
with a reversionary clause if the land were no longer used as a
railroad.
Similarly, brownfield redevelopment is subject to considerable
regulation, but regulation alone should not be sufficient for
accountability. However, transactions that include Activity and
Use Limitations or covenants running with the land can likely
establish the appropriate level of control. Because the focus here
is on collateral takings to foster the redevelopment of the
contaminated site, the takings and development would also
progress in accordance with a redevelopment plan for all the land
as a whole. Similar to the conditions in Kelo, the dispositions to
private parties following condemnation could and should require
enforceable agreements to execute the redevelopment in
accordance with the plan. 137 Only where such conditions were
included in the transfer would takings here meet this element.
3. Independent Significance
Where the property is selected because of facts of
"independent public significance" rather than the interests of the
private entity to which the property is eventually transferred, the
public use requirement can be satisfied.13 8 Because of the barriers
to brownfield redevelopment and the availability of greenfield
options, rarely will the private sector choose a brownfield site
solely on its own interests. 139

Where the private market is

redeveloping brownfield sites it is largely being swayed by the
public sector with various forms of incentives.' 40
Moreover, one object of the redevelopment is to mitigate or
136. See id. at 784.
137. In Kelo the Court rejected the idea that the expected public benefits
must be reasonably certain to occur, deferring instead to the determinations
of the local government of what was necessary to effectuate the project. See
125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667-68 (2005).
138. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459-60 (Mich. 1981).
139. See BARTSCH ET AL., supra note 120, at 7-8.
140. See Lange & McNeil, supra note 2, at 110 (successful sites are more
likely to have incentives available for the developer).
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eliminate a threat to public health and safety and to return an
underutilized parcel to active and efficient use. As such, just like
blight removal, it is the location of the contaminated property that
determines the land to be condemned. 14 1 Brownfield sites are
identified by the nature of what lies in the ground and the need to
remove those contaminants or the threat that they pose to the
public health and redevelopment of the land. The collateral
takings considered here are intended to aid in that redevelopment
and in so doing mitigate the public health issue. These lands are
identified by their ability to contribute to the redevelopment.
Thus, they are selected by factors independent of any developer's
interests.
IV. CONCLUSION

Each state is empowered to make its own determination
regarding whether and how to limit economic development as a
public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain. Michigan's
decision in Hathcock is just one example, but offers reasonable
limits on the condemnation power distilled from traditionally
permitted takings. Under either the broad view of Kelo or narrow
interpretation of Hathcock, collateral takings to foster the
redevelopment of contaminated lands should satisfy the public use
requirement to exercise the power of eminent domain. Given the
significance of brownfield redevelopment to the health and vitality
of American cities, the tool of eminent domain should not be taken
away on the basis of a vague conception of economic development.
Despite the reality that municipalities are justly hesitant to
acquire contaminated parcels, 142 legislatures should not tie the
hands of local governments. Eminent domain should always be a
last resort and the natural checks of transaction costs and political
accountability reduce the risks of abuse. 14 3 In addition, when the
specter of liability and stigma of contaminated land are introduced
the likelihood of abuse is minimized. Given the significant role
brownfield sites may play in the redevelopment of aging cities, it
is important to ensure the tool is available when no other practical

141. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480.
142. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004).
143. See William Yardley, The Court of Public Opinion Trumps Justice's
Ruling, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Nov. 21, 2005, at Al.
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means exist. Although some states are permitting the acquisition

of the contaminated land itself, the redevelopment of that land by
itself is not likely to be feasible. In addition to real barriers raised
by the presence of contamination, many brownfield sites are small
functionally obsolete parcels in poor locations. Remediation may
only be achievable through acquisition of additional lands.
In planning for the future of American cities, brownfield
redevelopment is sound policy for the efficient use of resources,
leveraging existing infrastructure, and mitigating the sprawling
effects of greenfield development. 144 More importantly however,
brownfield redevelopment is often the only option in the nation's
aging cities struggling to adapt to changing economies and social
structures that make new demands on limited land resources.
Many New England cities, for example, were built out long
ago during the height of the industrial revolution. As the market
shifted to the south these towns were left with deteriorating mill
buildings and obsolete lands contaminated by the unregulated
industry of the time. What once was a complex of mill buildings
owned by a single corporation is now a combination of dozens of
individually owned parcels of varying sizes. 14 5 Thus, there are
many situations where existing models and rationales for eminent
domain may be applied to assist an economic development effort
involving a contaminated parcel.
The legislature is the proper body to decide in what situations
eminent domain should be permitted. However, simply barring
"economic development" and providing for an exception for the
contaminated land itself ignores the realities facing the nation's
aging cities. The Institute for Justice has proposed such model
legislation in Connecticut. 146 That model statute should be
amended to include an exemption that would allow for the type of
remediation strategy discussed here.
144. See EPA, supra note 102; see also ICMA, Why Smart Growth: A
Primer 30 (1998), http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/WhySmartGrowthbk.pdf.

145.

See City of Lowell, Massachusetts, Jackson Appleton Middlesex

Urban Revitalization and Development Plan, 55-56 (2000), available at
http://www.lowellma.gov/depts/dpd/projects/j am.
146. See Institute for Justice, IJ and Homeowners to Connecticut

Legislators: Adopt Real Eminent Domain Reform, Oct. 6, 2005,
http://www.ij.org/private-property/connecticut/10-6-05pr.html. The proposed
legislation is available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/jud/ProposedEminent.asp.
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That amendment might read something like the following:
Private property taken by eminent domain may be
transferred or leased to private entities where a
redevelopment plan demonstrates that the property is
necessary to foster the redevelopment of other property
which, by reason of environmental contamination, poses a
threat to public health or safety in its present condition
and where redevelopment of such property will be
implemented in accordance with said plan.
Redeveloping contaminated land requires private market
assistance, but where the nature of such properties erects barriers
to private sector participation, the public sector should not be
stripped of any tools that might remove those barriers. Where
eminent domain may make redevelopment of contaminated land
feasible, it should be allowed.
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